Empire by Default

Timed to coincide with the centennial of the Spanish-American War, Musicant's latest history (after Divided Waters) shows solid command of published sources in a work that compares favorably to David Trask's standard The War with Spain in 1898 (1981). Musicant's nuanced approach stresses the desire of both President William McKinley and his Democratic predecessor, Grover Cleveland, to avoid any international issues that might impede America's recovery from the economic depression of 1893. Cuba, however, was impossible to ignore because of Spain's inability to develop either a military or a political solution to the insurrection that racked the island. Even without the impact of ""yellow journalism,"" war was nearly impossible to avert after the sinking of the Maine--which Musicant attributes to an internal explosion. Musicant demonstrates that American operational and logistical performances were far better than might have been expected, given the complete lack of experience in every kind of fighting the Army and Navy undertook. The greatest U.S. weaknesses, he explains, were administrative; the country raised a much larger army than needed, only to find its military bureaucracy swamped by the resulting demands. Nor did anyone at planning and policy levels have any idea of the long-term consequences of the large-scale expeditions that decided the war. Philippine independence in particular was a chimera. Emilio Aguinaldo's rebels were only one of many armed factions, and a weak state was certain to attract foreign attention, leading to annexation and pacification being considered as a least-unacceptable option. Musicant explores the ideology behind this policy, and satisfyingly demonstrates the beginnings of the American trade ""empire"" to have been less exploitative than altruistic. Eight b&w photos not seen by PW. Rights (except electronic): Holt. (Feb.)