Making Enemies

PW Talks with Robert Dreyfuss

by Raffi Khatchadourian -- Publishers Weekly, 9/26/2005

Startling and provocative, Devil's Game (reviewed Sept. 12) traces the history of America's support of fundamentalist Islam.

Did the United States have any role in the creation of al-Qaeda?

The short answer is, no. Al-Qaeda was established after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan [which began in 1988], and I would say that before the 1990s the United States was only dimly aware—if at all—that al-Qaeda existed. But there is a longer answer. The Islamic fundamentalist movement was a force that the United States played with for decades. In Afghanistan during the 1980s, we were responsible both for the organization of an international jihadi force and for specifically helping Osama bin Laden, who was until then fairly unknown. So in that sense we created the conditions for the emergence of al-Qaeda. And I would argue that we helped create the ideological underpinnings of the Islamist movement as well.

Why did we do that?

During the Cold War, the United States saw political Islam as a potential ally because it was anti-Communist, anti-Marxist and anti-Arab nationalist. In the 1950s, during the so-called Arab Cold War—in which nationalists, whose standard bearer was Nasser of Egypt, were pitted against the kings and emirs, particularly Saudi Arabia—we chose sides with Saudi Arabia. People who had some understanding of the Middle East believed that the U.S. should identify itself with Arab nationalism. But too often their voices were drowned out by those who argued that leaders like Nasser were untrustworthy because they did not want to join anti-Communist alliances. Even today, we find ourselves looking at the Middle East and deciding that perhaps conservative Islamic movements are more reliable than nationalists.

But after 9/11, we also unseated the Taliban, and you were against that.

I thought a heavy-handed occupation of Afghanistan would cause more problems than it solved. A far more surgical approach aimed at bin Laden and his organization would have been more effective and far less costly. Right now we don't know where bin Laden is. Maybe people have forgotten that he is still out there, and that al-Qaeda–style organizations are being spawned all over the world. This threat is better handled by intelligence agencies. I don't see it as a particularly good area for the Pentagon. You can't just invade all of these countries where Islamic cells are forming. If that were true we would have had to have invaded London.