On a Knife Edge: How Germany Lost the First World War

University of Leeds historian Afflerbach (How Fighting Ends) delivers a thorough reassessment of Germany’s role in WWI. He contends that German leaders’ rigid adherence to the Schlieffen Plan backfired when the 1914 invasion of Belgium sparked international outrage and Great Britain’s entrance into the fray, though the successes of German forces on the Western Front and the country’s deeply held belief in the superiority of its troops led to overconfidence. After Russia’s stunning victory at the Battle of Tannenberg in August 1914, tensions increased between Chief of the General Staff Erich von Falkenhayn, who urged political leaders to seek a negotiated peace with France and Russia as the war became entrenched in the west, and Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and Quartermaster General Erich Ludendorff, who ultimately succeeded in radicalizing Germany’s military strategy, giving the impression of “feral militarism” to those both inside and outside the country. Peace prospects dimmed fatally with the entrances of Italy and Romania into the conflict in 1915 and 1916, respectively, according to Afflerbach, who argues that the Allies “bore a great deal of the responsibility for [the war’s] long duration.” Though the book’s granular specificity can be heavy-going at times, Afflerbach convincingly shows that Germany’s fate was not inevitable. WWI scholars and enthusiasts will relish this exhaustive deep dive. (Oct.)