The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One

Kilcullen, adviser on counterinsurgency to General Petraeus, defines “accidental guerrillas” as locals fighting primarily because outsiders (often Westerners) are intruding into their physical and cultural space, but they may also be galvanized by high-tech, internationally oriented ideologues. This interaction of two kinds of nonstate opponents renders both traditional counterterrorism and counterinsurgency inadequate. Kilcullen uses Afghanistan and Iraq as primary case studies for a new kind of war that relies on an ability to provoke Western powers into protracted, exhausting, expensive interventions. Kilcullen presents two possible responses. Strategic disruption keeps existing terrorists off balance. Military assistance attacks the conditions producing “accidental guerrillas.” That may mean full-spectrum assistance, involving an entire society. Moving beyond a simplistic “war on terror” depends on rebalancing military and nonmilitary elements of power. It calls for a long view, a measured approach and a need to distinguish among various enemies. It requires limiting the role of government agencies in favor of an indirect approach emphasizing local interests and local relationships. Not least, Kilcullen says, breaking the terrorist cycle requires establishing patterns of “virtue, moral authority, and credibility” in the larger society. Kilcullen’s compelling argument merits wide attention. (Mar.)