State of War: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1945–2011

This concludes a magisterial, controversial five-volume study of the political economy of American warfare. Analyzing the development of the nation’s mobilization of its economic resources in the period beginning in 1945, Koistinen (Arsenal of World War II, 1940–1945) focuses on the synergy among five essential factors. First is the historically unique interaction of foreign and defense policies during the cold war and afterward. Second is the fact that foreign policy created national security demands—not the other way round. Defense requirements in turn facilitated the growth of the military-industrial complex—a “warfare cohort” that became so entrenched in the nation’s structure and culture that, Koistinen says, diminishing it has become virtually inconceivable. Third, the military-industrial complex began in the 19th century, with the transforming effects of technology on weaponry. Effective response required a team of administrators, soldiers, and industrialists to coordinate planning. That leads to Koistinen’s fourth point. America’s lack of an “elite, professional, and expandable” civil service system required for government to partner with corporate and financial communities. The decisive fifth factor was the armed forces’ acceptance of such partnerships as an essential element of modern warfare. Koistinen’s case that the institutionalization of economic mobilization has contributed to an increasingly dysfunctional “special interests state” is debatable, but merits careful consideration. (Sept.)