Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine

Global affairs analyst Galeotti (The Weaponisation of Everything) provides a well-sourced and sobering analysis of Vladimir Putin’s military objectives. When Putin came to power in 2000, Galeotti writes, Russia’s military was “scarcely functional.” In short order, however, the armed forces were downsized, modernized, and trained to engage in diverse forms of combat. Victories in the Second Chechen War and the 2008 invasion of Georgia nevertheless exposed weaknesses, including poorly trained troops and neglected equipment; according to Galeotti, more than a quarter of the armored vehicles deployed to Georgia broke down before reaching the battlefield. In response, Putin reshuffled the High Command and installed a new defense minister, Anatolyi Serdyukov, who promptly sacked 200 generals, decommissioned aging arms, closed military schools, and reorganized the nationwide system of battle commands, emphasizing smaller brigades capable of moving swiftly into regional combat. With the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the war in Syria in 2015, Russia became “a much leaner, more responsive and effective military,” but many of those gains were squandered by Putin’s “overreach” in Ukraine. Galeotti skillfully analyzes Russia’s military-industrial complex, shedding valuable light on commanders’ personality clashes and Putin’s handling of them. This is an impeccable resource for those seeking context for the current crisis in Ukraine. (Nov.)